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ABSTRACT
Homophily — our tendency to surround ourselves with others who
share our perspectives and opinions about the world — is both a
part of human nature and an organizing principle underpinning
many of our digital social networks. However, when it comes to
politics or culture, homophily can amplify tribal mindsets and pro-
duce “echo chambers” that degrade the quality, safety, and diversity
of discourse online. While several studies have empirically proven
this point, few have explored how making users aware of the ex-
tent and nature of their political echo chambers influences their
subsequent beliefs and actions. In this paper, we introduce Social
Mirror, a social network visualization tool that enables a sample of
Twitter users to explore the politically-active parts of their social
network. We use Social Mirror to recruit Twitter users with a prior
history of political discourse to a randomized experiment where we
evaluate the effects of different treatments on participants’ i) beliefs
about their network connections, ii) the political diversity of who
they choose to follow, and iii) the political alignment of the URLs
they choose to share. While we see no effects on average political
alignment of shared URLs, we find that recommending accounts of
the opposite political ideology to follow reduces participants’ be-
liefs in the political homogeneity of their network connections but
still enhances their connection diversity one week after treatment.
Conversely, participants who enhance their belief in the political
homogeneity of their Twitter connections have less diverse network
connections 2-3 weeks after treatment. We explore the implications
of these disconnects between beliefs and actions on future efforts
to promote healthier exchanges in our digital public spheres.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Americans are increasingly sorting themselves according to their
ideological stances on political issues [23] and allegiances to po-
litical parties [27]. Many prior studies have illustrated how these
forces, among others, have contributed to an increase in levels of
“affective polarization” — i.e., strong negative emotions members
of one particular party feel for those in another [15]. This affective
polarization is particularly concerning for the quality and nature of
civic discourse, as it is often grounded in tribal loyalties and group
think that sidestep rational discussion and debate on the issues that
extend beyond politics and directly affect quality of life.
While the historical roots of polarized politics in America run
centuries deep [4], the rise of digital media and other online dis-
course platforms have led researchers to investigate how political
polarization manifests and evolves in these more modern contexts.
For example, Sunstein highlighted how “echo chambers” in online
settings — where individuals with similar political views assem-
ble to discuss particular issues — can enable mutually-reinforcing
opinions to shift individual perspectives towards poles of greater
extremity [24].
Several empirical studies have sought to better-understand how
social media platforms can exacerbate polarization. Yardi and Boyd
showed how replies between like-minded Twitter users occur more
often than between users who differ in their political views — and
that discussing a highly-politicized issue tends to strengthen group
identity [28]. Adamic and Glance uncovered how political blogs
tend to link to other blogs that represent similar political ideologies
and have few links to those with opposing views [1]. Conover et
al. studied Tweets made during the 2010 mid-term elections to find
ideologically-cocooned Twitter retweet networks but ideologically-
mixed mention networks — suggesting homophilous endorsement
patterns accompanied by a tendency for politically active users
to inject partisan content and “call out” their counterparts on the
other side [7]. Therefore, even when social media platforms create
opportunities for cross-cutting dialog, the dialog is often much
more about shouting than truly listening.
More recently, Bakshy et al. investigated the nature of political
echo chambers on Facebook, where left and right-leaning users
not only tend to connect with those who share their perspectives,
but also, tend to share different news and other media URLs [3].
While the exact impact of the Internet on mass polarization in
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America is still up for debate [6, 17], it appears that on platforms
like Twitter, users are increasingly following accounts that share
their own political views [12].
In the face of this “ideological cocooning” on social media plat-
forms, it is natural to ask: what, if anything, can — or even should —
be done about it? The complexity of human beings’ “moral matrices”
[14] suggests that simply exposing people to opposing ideological
perspectives in hopes of changing their views may actually backfire
and further strengthen their a priori intuitions and beliefs [8].
Acknowledging this complexity, several interventions have lever-
aged different strategies to drive socio-political behavior change on
social media platforms. For example, a recent experiment sought
to reduce racism on Twitter by programming bot accounts with
varying social statuses to publicly scold offending accounts [20].
Other researchers have designed interventions that harness tech-
nology to promote self-reflection and awareness to drive behavior
change. For example, Matias et al. created a web application that
showed users how many men and women on Twitter they followed
in order to highlight and rectify gender imbalances [18]. To reduce
partisan media consumption, Munson et al. built a browser widget
that visually reflects back the balance (or lack thereof) in a given
users’ media consumption habits over some period of time [21].
Despite these examples, to our knowledge, no prior interventions
have sought to mitigate political echo chambers by showing users
an ideologically-cocooned subset of their digital social networks
and asking them to discover their level of social connectedness. Fur-
thermore, few have measured changes in belief alongside changes
in behaviors (e.g. connection diversity and content sharing patterns)
that such digital interventions may cause. Much like prior experi-
ments in the psychological and political sciences have illustrated
how providing perspective and exposing “illusions of understand-
ing” on political issues can help moderate extreme views [10], we
are interested in exploring how guided data visualizations can pro-
vide perspective to expose forces that ossify social media echo
chambers. In doing so, we make the following contributions:
• A web application that enables a sample of Twitter users to
explore their politically-active digital discourse networks,
• A proof of concept for a new type of network intervention
that explores the impact of data visualizations on partici-
pants’ beliefs and actions vis-a-vis social media echo cham-
bers, and
• A more granular understanding of how social media users
perceive digital echo chambers and some of the challenges
and opportunities these perceptions may pose for future
efforts to mitigate them.
2 SOCIAL MIRROR
Social Mirror is a web application that allows users to explore a
sample of their politically-active Twitter connections. These connec-
tions are visually-depicted in the form of a social network. Our main
hypothesis is that by presenting social media users with a bird’s-
eye view of an ideologically-fragmented social network and asking
them to identify their positions within it, we can help cultivate
intellectual humility and motivate more diverse content-sharing
and information-seeking behaviors.
Figure 1: Visual depiction of network from the Social Mirror web
application. Nodes represent a sample of nearly 900 Twitter ac-
counts that participated in the conversation about the US Presi-
dential Election between June and mid-September 2016, and edges
represent mutual-follower relationships between these accounts.
Nodes are sized according to relative PageRank in the depicted net-
work, and colored according to ideology inferred using the political
ideology classifier described in [26]. The network is laid out using
a standard force directed layout algorithm. A screen capture video
of the application can be found here: https://goo.gl/SRTvxc. The live
application can be found here: https://socialmirror.media.mit.edu. Note
that the actual network shown to participants appears on a black
background.
2.1 Dataset
The network is derived from a sample of 1.1M Twitter users who
participated in the conversation about the US Presidential Election
on the platform between June and mid-September 20161. The sam-
ple was drawn from a larger project which automatically detected
and categorized Election-related Tweets over an 18-month period
leading up to the Election [25].
We built a mutual follower network across this set of users,
where a connection between two users means that they followed
each other on Twitter at some point within the aforementioned date
range. We then filter down this network to its 4-core — i.e., the set
of users who have at least 4 mutual connections with other users —
yielding approximately 32k nodes and 200k edges. For visualization,
we select approximately 900 of the highest-degree nodes and their
corresponding mutual connections among one another.
The social network is visualized using a 3D force directed layout
algorithm, which results in accounts with more shared social con-
nections being positioned closer together (Figure 1). Interestingly,
the visualized network contains two major clusters: one includes a
small, tightly-bound set of politically right-leaning accounts, and
1Captured by the Electome project: http://electome.org.
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the other includes a larger set of both right and left-leaning accounts.
Because of the computational expense of dynamically fetching and
building the M-degree Twitter social network centered on an arbi-
trary Twitter user (for some integer M > 1), we limit use of Social
Mirror to only those 32k accounts in the pre-computed 4-core of
the full network.
2.2 User experience
Upon logging into the application, the user answers a series of
questions regarding the nature of her engagement in political dis-
course on Twitter (details provided in the next section). Next, the
application presents a network visualization of some of the user’s
immediate Twitter followers and friends. It then expands to show
the entire 900 node visualization. The user is encouraged to explore
the network by zooming and rotating it. She can also hover over
and highlight groups of accounts to browse which election-related
tweets they made during summer 2016. The application then asks
the user to locate herself within the network by clicking on the
node that she believes represents her Twitter account. After she
makes her guess, the tool reveals her true position and indicates
how many degrees (i.e. hops) away it is from her guessed location.
The user is also shown a number between 0 and 1, which indicates
how politically diverse her connections are. Depending on which
experimental treatment the user is enrolled in, she may also see
a list of suggested accounts to follow that would increase her di-
versity score. Finally, the user is asked to complete a post-survey,
which is equivalent to the questionnaire she answered at the be-
ginning of the experience. The user is also prompted to answer a
demographics survey, which asks for her political ideology, age,
and gender2.
2.3 Technology
The application is optimized for the Chrome and Firefoxweb browsers.
We used the THREE JavaScript library for WebGL rendering of
nodes and edges. We used the JavaScript library Preact — a simpli-
fied version of React — to manage state on the client. The server is
built using the Flask web framework.
3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We are interested in exploring the following overarching question:
to what extent does making social media users aware of their online
political echo chambers affect their beliefs and future platform
engagement patterns? In particular, we design an intervention to
help us measure changes in the following response variables for
each participant p:
R1: The difference in p’s answers to four survey questions ad-
ministered before and after treatment,
R2: The difference in the political diversity of the set of accounts
p follows on Twitter before treatment and 1, 2, and 3 weeks
after, and
2We also asked users to indicate their profession and how they would describe their
politics — i.e. in support of established politics, against established politics, or some-
where in between — but omit these results from the rest of the study due to data
sparsity.
R3: The difference in the political alignment of the set of URLs
shared by p, extracted from the (up to) 200 tweets made
before and after treatment.
For R1, the set of pre/post Likert scale survey questions shown
to participants include:
Q1: I am well-connected into the conversation about US Politics
on Twitter.
Q2: Most of my connections on Twitter who discuss politics
share my political views.
Q3: There are legitimate political views voiced on Twitter that I
disagree with.
Q4: I would be interested in talking to a Twitter user who does
not share my political views.
For R2, we compute political diversity using Shannon’s entropy
and infer the political ideology of each account p follows using a
state-of-the-art classifier presented in [26]. R3 is measured using
political alignment scores inferred as a part of [3] for different web
domains. The results section provides additional details on each of
these outcome variables and how they are computed. We can think
of these response variables as seeking to measure changes in what
participants “believe” (R1), who they “listen” to (R2), and what they
“speak” about (R3) on Twitter — all of which help to illuminate the
nature of political echo chambers on social media.
3.1 Treatments
We design three treatments in the Social Mirror application and
evaluate their effects on the above response variables. The treat-
ments are designed to gradually increase the amount of information
and corresponding set of choices users have in order to mitigate
their own echo chambers. The treatments are as follows:
Viz: Participants are shown amono-color (gray) social network
where nodes are not colored according to their ideology.
After participants try and guess their location in the social
network, they are shown their true position, along with a
diversity score between 0 and 1 representing the political
diversity of their connections in the network visualization
(where 1 implies a perfectly balanced set of left and right-
leaning followers).
Viz+Ideo: Same as Viz, except nodes are colored according to
inferred political ideology (red = right leaning; blue = left
leaning; gray = in the middle or unsure).
Ideo+Rec: Same asViz+Ideo, except users are also recommended
up to five Twitter accounts they can follow in order to boost
their network political diversity scores. As users click on
accounts to indicate their interest in following them, they are
visually shown how following these accounts would increase
their connection diversity scores.
Figure 2 shows the three treatments. In Ideo+Rec, accounts are
recommended to user u in order of which would have the greatest
impact on enhancing u’s displayed diversity score. Therefore, we
only recommend accounts that would monotonically increase u’s
diversity score if followed. In addition to the treatments, we also
sampled 81 users from the original dataset (as a control group for
R2 and R3) who were never contacted about the study.
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a) b) c)
Figure 2: Visual depictions of intervention treatment groups: (a) corresponds to treatment Viz, where users are asked to find their Twitter
account in the network visualization where nodes are not colored by ideology. Users in Viz+Ideo (b) have the same experience as those in Viz,
but see a social network with nodes colored according to inferred political ideology for each account (red = right-leaning; blue = left-leaning;
gray = moderate or unsure). Users in Ideo+Rec (c) have the same experience as those in Viz+Ideo, except they are also recommended up to 5
pre-selected Twitter accounts with opposing political views to follow and visually shown how following themwould increase their connection
diversity scores. Note that the actual network shown to participants appears on a black background.
Without knowing the experimental population in advance (i.e.
we did not know which of the users we invited would actually
participate in the experiment), we were unable to use more sophis-
ticated experimental designs such as completely-randomized or
block-randomized assignment. This is a common challenge when
running randomized experiments online [2].
3.2 Recruitment
To recruit study participants, we sampled 1,273 users who had self-
enabled their Twitter accounts to accept Direct Messages from any
other Twitter account. We sent them Direct Messages from a re-
search account created for the project, inviting them to participate
in the study. Messages were sent in two rounds — test and deploy-
ment — to test message quality and select one with the highest
likelihood of recruitment (participation results from both rounds
are shown together in section 4). Users who clicked through to the
application were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments
described above. We include a copy of the final recruitment message
(sent to most users) in the Appendix.
Users were never required to participate and could choose to
completely ignore or disregard the recruitment message. Upon
landing on the application’s home page, participants could also
read a privacy policy for more information on which kinds of data
the application would collect and how it might be used. This study
was approved by MIT’s IRB.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Participant statistics
Approximately 93 users accounted for 108 distinct Social Mirror
sessions between June 22, 2017 and August 3, 20173. For the re-
maining analyses, we consider only data collected during each
user’s first session. 32, 26, and 35 of the 93 sessions were randomly
3I.e., 7.3% of people who were sent Direct Messages and invited to participate did so
in the time horizon highlighted above
assigned to experimental treatments Viz, Viz+Ideo, and Ideo+Rec,
respectively. The median length of each session was 5.8 minutes.
Approximately 53 of the 93 unique users completed both the pre
and post-experiment survey, and 52 of these 53 answered at least
one demographics post-survey question. Table 1 shows several
user-level properties, including: pre-treatment survey responses,
Twitter personas (average URL alignment, connection diversity,
verified status, number of followers/followees), and self-reported
demographics (gender, age, and political ideology). Respondents
appear to heavily skew male, liberal, and between the ages of 25-44
— likely influenced by the fact that large portions of Americans are
under-represented on Twitter [19]. To test for the robustness of
our randomization, we use a logistic regression to check whether
there are any significant differences in the distribution of these
properties across treatments. We find no properties have statisti-
cally significant coefficients in this model. We assess the model’s
overall significance by comparing its log-likelihood to a distribution
of log-likelihoods generated by 100k logistic regressions, each of
which regresses a random shuffling of participant-treatment as-
signments against the aforementioned properties of interest [13].
We find the log-likelihood of our actual model is not statistically
significant when compared to this distribution (p = 0.48), suggesting
sound randomization and no significant difference in the measured
pre-treatment characteristics of the participants.
4.2 Pre and post-survey responses
Each question in our pre/post survey can be answered with a re-
sponse from a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree”
(value of 1) to “Strongly agree” (value of 5). Let rqpreu and r
qpost
u
be user u’s response to question q in the pre or post-survey, re-
spectively, and yqu = r
qpost
u - r
qpre
u — i.e., the change in user u’s
response to question q after treatment. We use the following linear
regression model to measure the causal effect of each experimental
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Property Control Viz Viz+Ideo Ideo+Rec Totals
Number of participants 81 32 26 35 174
Median # followers (std. dev.) 1562 (9080) 3023 (27390) 2471 (9137) 1724 (29083)
Median # followees (std. dev.) 711 (350) 837 (576) 667 (293) 717 (424)
|Pre URL alignment| (std. dev) 0.184 (0.09) 0.171 (0.11) 0.196 (0.07) 0.180 (0.10)
Pre connection diversity (std. dev) 0.413 (0.17) 0.428 (0.15) 0.472 (0.16) 0.457 (0.136)
Avg Q1 pre-response (std. dev.) 4.37 (0.60) 4.18 (0.73) 4.29 (0.85)
Avg Q2 pre-response (std. dev.) 3.47 (0.9) 3.24 (1.0) 3.88 (0.99)
Avg Q3 pre-response (std. dev.) 4.26 (0.81) 4.18 (0.64) 4.35 (0.61)
Avg Q4 pre-response (std. dev.) 3.79 (0.98) 4.10 (0.56) 3.94 (1.0)
Verified on Twitter 12 8 6 6 32
Political ideology
Liberal 10 7 9 26
Conservative 2 1 4 7
Moderate 4 2 0 6
Gender
Female 3 4 2 9
Male 14 13 13 40
Other 1 1 1 3
Age
18-24 4 2 3 9
25-34 4 4 10 18
35-44 4 5 3 12
45-54 2 3 1 6
55-64 2 3 0 5
65+ 2 0 0 2
Table 1: Twitter persona, pre-survey responses, and demographic information describing Social Mirror experiment participants. Note that
demographic information is only available for 52 out of the 93 participants who were exposed to at least one treatment. Respondents appear
to heavily skew male, liberal, and between the ages of 25-44. We find no significant imbalances in these values across treatments.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
β0 -0.32 (0.03)** 0.11 (0.52) -0.05 (0.54) 0 (1)
βV iz+Ideo -0.04 (0.86) 0.42 (0.08)* -0.01 (0.96) 0 (1)
βIdeo+Rec 0.37 (0.07)* -0.28 (0.23) 0.11 (0.37) -0.18 (0.08)*
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Effects of treatments on changes in between pre and
post-responses to each survey question. Variable coefficients
are provided in each cell, with p-values provided in adjacent
parenthesis. N=53.
treatment on yqu :
y
q
u = β0 + βV iz+Ideo · xV iz+Ideo,u + βIdeo+Rec · xIdeo+Rec,u + ϵu ,
where xV iz+Ideo,u and xIdeo+Rec,u are binary variables that in-
dicate user u’s experimental treatment4, βV iz+Ideo and βIdeo+Rec
are their coefficients, respectively, β0 is the intercept, and ϵu is the
error term.
Table 2 shows the average treatment effects of Viz+Ideo and
Ideo+Rec for each of the four questions, relative to Viz. Interestingly,
themodels for Q1, Q3, and Q4 are not statistically significant at thep
= 0.1 level - though for Q1, the model is nearly significant (p = 0.11).
4E.g., when the user is in Viz+Ideo, xV iz+Ideo,u = 1 and xIdeo+Rec,u = 0.
Furthermore, for Q1, we find that participants in Ideo+Rec tend to
increase their belief in how well-connected they are into political
discourse on Twitter (βIdeo+Rec = 0.37, p = 0.07) compared to those
in Viz. When comparing Ideo+Rec only to Viz+Ideo, the effects are
even stronger (β0 = -0.35, βIdeo+Rec = 0.41, p = 0.03). We find that
both of these results are likely due to the fact that some users in
Ideo+Rec choose to follow accounts they are recommended towards
the end of their treatment. If we remove from the regression those
individuals who follow at least one of the recommended accounts (7
out of 35 participants, or 20%5), the effects of Ideo+Rec are reduced
with respect to Viz+Ideo but still significant at p = 0.1 (β0 = -0.35,
βIdeo+Rec = 0.35, p = 0.08). Interestingly, this suggests that simply
receiving recommendations appears to increase participants’ beliefs
that they are well-connected.
For Q2 (i.e. Most of my connections on Twitter who discuss politics
share my political views), we find a relatively strong, significant
influence of treatment on participants’ beliefs about the level of
political homophily among their social ties (p = 0.02 for the overall
model). In particular, participants in Viz+Ideo tend to increase their
belief that most of their connections on Twitter who discuss politics
share their political views (βV iz+Ideo = 0.42, p = 0.08). Looking
5To determine if a user has accepted one of our recommendations, we check to see
if their list of followed accounts one day after treatment contains at least one of the
accounts recommended during treatment.
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w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
β0 0.007 (0.21) 0.003 (0.64) 0.01 (0.08)*
βV iz -0.008 (0.54) -0.002 (0.87) -0.01 (0.52)
βV iz+Ideo -0.007 (0.60) -0.005 (0.75) -0.01 (0.39)
βIdeo+Rec -0.006 (0.66) -0.003 (0.87) -0.01 (0.45)
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
Table 3: Effects of treatments on changes in the politi-
cal diversity of network connections 1-3 weeks after treat-
ment. Variable coefficients are provided in each cell, with p-
values provided in adjacent parenthesis. N=174 (81 control;
93 across Viz, Viz+Ideo, and Ideo+Rec).
at pairwise effects between treatments, participants in Viz+Ideo
increase their belief more than those in Viz (β0 = 0.11, βV iz+Ideo =
0.42, p = 0.09), while participants in Ideo+Rec tend to decrease their
belief more than those in Viz+Ideo (β0 = 0.53, βIdeo+Rec = -0.71,
p = 0.01). Even after removing those from Ideo+Rec who followed
recommended accounts, the remaining participants in Ideo+Rec
are significantly more likely to decrease in their belief that their
connections share their political views when compared to those
in Viz+Ideo (β0 = 0.53, βIdeo+Rec = -0.61, p = 0.03). Once again,
account recommendations seem to decrease participants’ beliefs in
their level of political homophily on Twitter.
While we see no significant effects of treatments on Q3, we
observe several outcomes for Q4. For one, participants in Ideo+Rec
decrease in their willingness to have a conversation with a Twitter
user who does not share their political views (βIdeo+Rec = -0.18, p =
0.08) in the full model with all treatments included — an effect that
strengthens when removing those users in Ideo+Rec who follow
at least one recommended account (βIdeo+Rec = -0.23, p = 0.04).
Pairwise comparisons yield no significant effects.
Together, these findings suggest an important point: while visu-
ally and quantitatively depicting participants’ network polarization
(Viz+Ideo) enhances their belief in the extent to which they live in a
political echo chamber, supplementing this with recommendations
for people to follow actually produces the opposite effect — and
even leads participants to indicate they are less-inclined to want
to have a conversation with someone from the other side of the
political aisle. As recent work has suggested, the choice of account
recommendations affects the extent to which political polarization
and “controversy” decrease on platforms like Twitter [11]. There-
fore, under alternative recommendation schemes — e.g. not seeking
to maximize connection diversity — our findings might differ.
4.3 Network connection diversity
We also evaluate the effect of treatments on the political diversity of
each participant’s social network6 1, 2, and 3 weeks after use. In par-
ticular, we use Shannon’s entropy similar to other studies exploring
network connection diversity [5, 9, 22] to quantify the balance of
left and right-leaning accounts the user follows. Under this metric,
6Namely, their “followees” — i.e., who they follow on Twitter.
w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
β0 -0.001 (0.22) 0.001 (0.54) 0.002 (0.11)
βV iz+Ideo 0.001 (0.38) -0.003 (0.09)* -0.004 (0.04)**
βIdeo+Rec 0.002 (0.04)** -0.000 (0.90) -0.002 (0.23)
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Effects of treatments on changes in the politi-
cal diversity of network connections 1-3 weeks after treat-
ment. Variable coefficients are provided in each cell, with
p-values provided in adjacent parenthesis. N=53 (i.e., only
those treated users who completed both the pre and post-
survey questionnaire).
user u’s diversityw weeks after treatment, dwu , is given by:
dwu = −
∑
l ∈L
pl log(pl ),
where L is the set of ideologies (in our case, left or right) and pl
is the fraction of u’s followeesw weeks after treatment who have
ideology l ∈ L7. We leverage the political classifier presented in
[26] to estimate the likelihood of a given Twitter account leaning
left or right and use a 60% threshold to assign final ideology labels8.
We explore the effect of Viz, Viz+Ideo, and Ideo+Rec on the change
in a given user’s connection diversity, compared to a control group
of 81 accounts sampled from the same mutual follower network of
32k users but not contacted to participate in the study. Here, our
regression model is:
ywu = β0 + βV iz · xV iz,u + βV iz+Ideo · xV iz+Ideo,u
+ βIdeo+Rec · xIdeo+Rec,u + ϵu ,
where xV iz,u , xV iz+Ideo,u , xIdeo+Rec,u are indicator variables
for each treatment, βV iz,u , βV iz+Ideo , βIdeo+Rec are the coeffi-
cients representing the corresponding treatment groups, β0 is the
intercept, ϵu is the error term, and ywu is defined for a given weekw
as dwu - d0u , where d0u is the political diversity of user u immediately
preceding her participation in the experiment. For users in the con-
trol group, we let d0u be the diversity of the user’s neighborhood
as of July 20, 2017 (when we initially recorded their social graphs).
Note that, as a validation filter, we include only treatment users
who completed both the pre and post-surveys. Table 3 shows the
results of our model. We find no significant effects of participating
in Social Mirror on a given Twitter user’s change in connection
diversity 1, 2, or 3 weeks after treatment.
Next, we remove the control group and explore effects across
users who participated in one of three treatments. Again, as a vali-
dation filter, we constrain our analyses to only those who also com-
pleted the pre and post surveys. Here, we find several interesting
7Note that our computation of network diversity here is slightly different than the
computation used to display to users their connection diversity scores during treatment.
In particular, the displayed scores are computed a) using only their connections in the
sampled network of 32k users, not their entire set of followees on Twitter, and b) using
terms weighted by the PageRank of the account followed in the sampled network -
so that following higher-PageRanking accounts of one ideology versus another leads
to a score less than 1 even if the absolute number of connections belonging to either
ideology are equivalent.
8We use a binary ideological classification scheme for simplicity, though one op-
portunity for future work includes conducting a similar study with a more flexible,
continuous notion of ideology.
Me, My Echo Chamber, and I: Introspection on Social Media Polarization WWW 2018, April 23–27, 2018, Lyon, France
results. For example, in the week following treatment, participants
in Ideo+Rec are significantly more likely to have higher network
diversity (βIdeo+Rec = 0.002, p = 0.04). Removing those who fol-
lowed recommended accounts still yields a significant increase,
albeit with smaller effects (βIdeo+Rec = 0.001, p = 0.08). In the 2 and
3 weeks that follow treatment, Viz+Ideo participants significantly
decrease in their connection diversity (βV iz+Ideo = -0.003, p = 0.09
and βV iz+Ideo = -0.004, p = 0.04, respectively). Table 4 summarizes
these results. Looking at pairwise effects between treatments across
weeks and removing those in Ideo+Rec who followed recommended
accounts reveals only one significant effect: a decrease in the con-
nection diversity of Viz+Ideo participants compared to those in Viz
3 weeks after treatment (β0 = 0.002, βV iz+Ideo = -0.004, p = 0.07).
These results suggest that while recommending accounts in-
creases the connection diversity of participants in Ideo+Rec in the
short-term — even for those who do not accept these recommenda-
tions — participants in Viz+Ideo tend to decrease in their connection
diversity 2-3 weeks after treatment compared to those in Viz.
4.4 Political alignment of shared content
In addition to who social media users choose to follow, the con-
tent they choose to share on these platforms also sheds light on
their ideological stance [3, 7]. We compute an average URL political
alignment score for each user u, A¯u , as follows:
A¯u =
1
|S |
∑
s ∈S
A(D(s)),
where S is the set of URLs shared by u and A(s) is data from [3]
which estimates the political alignment of s’s web domain, D(s). A
score of -1 for A(D(s)) implies URLs that belong to the same web
domain as s tend to be shared exclusively by left-leaning social
media users; 1 implies these URLs are shared exclusively by right-
leaning users; and within this range implies mixed sharing across
ideological groups (with 0 indicating balanced sharing).
Similar to the network diversity analysis, we first explore the
effect of any of the treatments on the change in a given user’s
connection diversity, compared to a control group of 200 Twitter ac-
counts who were sampled from the network but were not contacted
to participate in the study. Here, we use a simple regression model
with target variable yu = |A¯af teru | - |A¯bef oreu | — i.e., the difference
in the average political alignment of URLs shared within the ≤ 200
most recent tweets made by u before and after treatment (up to
400 tweets total). Notice that a positive value for yu indicates an
increased tendency for u to share politically-aligned content after
treatment compared to before.
We find no significant effects of participation in any treatment
group compared to the control. Next, we look for effects across
participants within one of the three treatment groups who also
completed both the pre/post-survey. Once again, we see no signifi-
cant effects of treatment group on the change in average political
alignment of shared URLs (p = 0.7). Comparing pairwise treatment
effects yields a similar null result across pairs. These null effects are
perhaps not surprising given that sharing content on social media
is often a sign of public endorsement [16], while our study was
designed more to explore the effects of reflective engagement with
social media echo chambers on what users believe and who they
choose to follow. Still, the absence of effects on average political
alignment of shared URLs reveals, in part, that driving different
outcomes will require designing different types of interventions.
5 DISCUSSION
Our results reveal a disconnect between beliefs and actions: while
participants in Viz+Ideo are more likely to enhance their belief in
the political homogeneity of their Twitter connections, they also
exhibit a significant decrease in the actual political diversity of their
followees 2-3 weeks after treatment. Conversely, after treatment,
participants in Ideo+Rec are more likely to follow Twitter accounts
that oppose their political views (driven in part by those who choose
to follow the accounts recommended to them as a part of treatment),
but also more likely to decrease in their belief that they actually
live in a political echo chamber — and more likely to decrease in
their willingness to have a conversation with a Twitter user with
opposing political views.
There are several possible explanations for this disconnect. For
example, immediately after using Social Mirror, Viz+Ideo partic-
ipants may have been convinced by the ideologically-cocooned
social network visualization, and their location within it, that their
connections are not as politically diverse as they may have previ-
ously thought. But over a slightly longer time horizon, it is possible
that users felt that by simply admitting to this imbalance, they were
addressing the issue — and hence, made few additional efforts to
actually follow accounts with opposing views or take other actions
to address the imbalance. Participants in Ideo+Rec may have re-
ceived account recommendations that failed to suit their personal
preferences, or perhaps they simply did not have enough context or
information to know why the recommended account is one worth
following — producing an initial desire to further disengage in
discourse with the “the other” and a reduced belief in how homo-
geneous their connections really are. But despite this belief, many
were still nudged into following accounts with opposing political
views perhaps simply because the idea of following accounts was
presented as an option.
While precise explanations for our results are elusive, it is clear
that encouraging discourse across ideological divides is not only a
multi-faceted challenge, but also regarded with mixed opinions in
the digital public sphere. We received several thought-provoking
written responses to our recruitment messages — messages that in-
formed recipients about the existence of ideological echo chambers
on social media platforms and the importance of engaging with
different viewpoints to achieve a “well-functioning democracy”.
For example, some commented that the responsibility of mitigating
ideological echo chambers should not simply be in the hands of the
individual, citing political institutions and algorithmic curation on
social media platforms as sharing responsibility, e.g.:
“Society can not afford to put all the social burden on
individuals, while the institutional masses are huddled
at Starbucks drinking lattes.”
“...it is not necessarily the users. Algorithms social media
companies use to put into your recommended feeds rely
on similar content to the things you have watched. Most
people are very constrained on time and will thus mostly
watch what they enjoy, which in political terms means
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what they agree with. These algorithms pick up on this
and then recommend what they agree with.”
Others challenged a key assumption underpinning many of our
design choices: ideology as a construct defined along a unidimen-
sional left/right spectrum. E.g.:
“...many of us have views requiring at least a 2-dimensional
representation - we’re off the left-right line.”
“There are people who have supported Trump for all
sorts of reasons. Some people, including myself, wanted
Trump to win because we had no idea what he would
do. There are other people who wanted Trump to win
because they thought he would accelerate the collapse
of America. I feel it is very important that you do not
use this as an indicator for politics, because virtually
everyone I speak with - including myself - dislikes Don-
ald Trump’s performance. Most of us, including myself,
disliked Donald Trump, but voted for him anyways ...
My own politics are hardly represented by the Demo-
crat/Republican dichotomy that is relevant to US politics
... ”
Still others challenged the assumption that they were even em-
bedded within a political echo chamber — or that they should seek
out opposing political views:
“I don’t at all feel like I am in an echo chamber as your
model described - there are no people on Twitter with
whom I can agree with on most things, and really it has
gotten lonely.”
“I systematically avoid anyone who parrots any of the
insane talking points of the left. That includes those who
want “fair and balanced” discussions between insane
leftists and sound right. Good luck with your research.I
already came to the conclusion that any kind of discus-
sion with the left is a total waste of time.”
“All viewpoints are not equally worthy of respect and
consideration and I get exposed to enough right wing
garbage without you trying to make me seek it out for
my own supposed edification.”
Despite some users’ desires to further disengage, others offered
their help or ideas for possible solutions:
“I too am interested in bubbles and actively engaging
with different viewpoints. Let me know if I can help!”
“There was a Planet money Podcast about a Reddit
where there were rules for arguing/stating opposing
viewpoints (“On Second Thought” - June 23, 2017). In it
they discussed a civil way to do so. Until that is some-
thing that is standard, the online community will con-
tinue to funnel itself into echo chambers. Additionally,
the amount of faceless cyber bullying on any side of an
argument—with no negative recourse, it seems—is yet
another reason people of like minds tend to cluster.”
The participants in our study and those who responded to our
recruitment messages are a biased sample of the American public:
Twitter users who actively discuss politics on social media. Still, our
results and their responses, together, reveal some of the challenges
and opportunities that await future attempts to mitigate political
echo chambers on social media.
6 CONCLUSION
Key Findings. In this study, we describe an online intervention us-
ing Social Mirror, a network visualization tool that enables a sample
of Twitter users to explore the politically-active parts of their social
network. We invite users to participate in a study in which we vary
several software features and ask users to find themselves in an
ideologically-cocooned social network in order to assess effects on
what participants “believe” (changes in their responses to pre/post-
survey questions), who they “listen” to (who they choose to follow
on Twitter after treatment), and what they “speak” about (changes
in the political alignment of the URLs they share on Twitter after
treatment). Our results reveal a disconnect between belief and ac-
tion. Participants who are asked to find their accounts in a sampled
social network where nodes are colored by inferred political ideol-
ogy tend to increase their belief in how ideologically-cocooned they
really are, but the political diversity of who they choose to follow
on Twitter actually decreases several weeks after treatment. Con-
versely, if participants explore an ideologically-cocooned network
and are subsequently recommended to follow up to five Twitter
accounts with opposing political views, the political diversity of
their followees increases one week after treatment — even though
participants believe less that they are in an echo chamber.
Limitations. We note several limitations of our study. For one,
our findings are a result of a very short amount of exposure (less
than 6 minutes on average) and therefore should not be general-
ized to contexts where similar treatments may be administered
more frequently or over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, our
sample of users is relatively small; recruiting additional users in
the future may reduce variance and, perhaps, increase the magni-
tude of observed effects. Additionally, flaws in our experimental
design prevent us from obtaining a more granular understanding
of which parts of the application influenced participants in which
ways. For example, under the current treatments, we are unable to
assess the effects of seeing a network visualization (versus just a
static score or some other visual indicators of political homophily)
on subsequent participants’ beliefs and actions. Additional flaws
include potential effects of pre/post-survey question wording and
possible network spillover effects on treatment outcomes. There is
also bias embedded in our recruitment efforts: by only contacting
those who we could reach through Direct Messages, we may have
skewed towards recruiting Twitter personas who are more recep-
tive and/or vocal on social media. More generally, we are sampling
a biased set of Twitter users — and, of course, the American public
as a whole — by only contacting accounts who participated in 2016
Election-related discourse on the platform during summer 2016,
and even more specifically, those who chose to click through and
accept the invitation to use the tool. Even by constraining some of
our analyses to only those who completed the pre and post-surveys,
we are introducing selection bias that undoubtedly influences the
nature and quality of results. These are important limitations to
consider for future interventions.
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Future Directions. There are several opportunities to build on
this study. For one, we may explore additional response variables
to further investigate the nature of ideological cocooning on social
platforms like Twitter: for example, measuring the impact of future
interventions on the quality or civility of subsequent discourse. The
observed disconnect between belief and action also suggests oppor-
tunities to design additional measurements that enable us to under-
stand this disconnect and if/how it changes over time. Given some
of the responses to our recruitment messages, we may also design
interventions grounded in a more nuanced, multi-dimensional rep-
resentation of political ideology — perhaps by focusing on specific
topics or issues, instead of creating a global, simplified indicator of
participants’ political views. Furthermore, future interventions may
peel back the assumption that “echo chambers are unfavorable”, and
instead, seek to understand the individual and environmental fac-
tors that produce different opinions on the topic. Indeed, enabling
quality, safe, and diverse discourse in our digital public spheres will
require, first and foremost, a degree of humility to listen and learn
from all of those who choose to participate.
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A APPENDIX
To recruit study participants (Section 3.2) we sent the following
message as a Twitter Direct Message:
We are a team of researchers at MIT analyzing polit-
ical polarization on social media platforms. We have
created a tool called "Social Mirror" that enables you
to interactively explore the politically-active parts of
your social network on Twitter. We are inviting a small
group of people to try out the tool, which you can find
here:
https://socialmirror.media.mit.edu
We’ve found that many politically-active Twitter users
embed themselves in echo chambers, surrounded by
people whose political perspectives reflect their own.
As a well-functioning democracy requires its citizens
to actively engage with different viewpoints, we are
interested in learning more about how we might help
mitigate online echo chambers.
If you have any ideas, questions, or feedback, please
message us at socialmirror@media.mit.edu. We look
forward to hearing from you!
